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Abstract
The paper first addresses Husserl’s conception of philosophical phenomenology,
metaphysics, and the relation between them, in order to explain why, on Husserl’s
view, there is no metaphysics of consciousness without a phenomenology of con-
sciousness. In doing so, it recalls some of the methodological tenets of Husserl’s phe-
nomenology, pointing out that phenomenology is an eidetic or a priori science which
has first of all to do with mere ideal possibilities of consciousness and its correlates;
metaphysics of consciousness, on the other hand, has to do with its reality or actual-
ity, requiring an eidetic foundation in order to become scientifically valuable.
Presuming that, if consciousness is to be the subject-matter of a metaphysics
which is not simply speculative or based on prejudice, it is crucial to get the phenom-
enology of consciousness right, the paper then engages in a detailed descriptive-
eidetic analysis of mental acts of re-presenting something and tries to argue that
their structures, involving components of non-actual experiencing, pose a serious
problem for a materialistic or physicalistic metaphysics of consciousness. The
paper ends with a brief comment on Husserl’s broader view of metaphysics,
having to do with the irrationality of the transcendental fact, i.e. the constitution
of the factual world and the factual life of the mind.
Let me first briefly comment on the perhaps somewhat puzzling title
of this paper. The philosophical background of my interest in con-
sciousness stems foremost from Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology.
The term ‘phenomenology’ (not unlike other terms with the suffix
‘-logy’, e.g. ‘bio-logy’, ‘geo-logy’, etc.) in the present context refers
to a theoretical enterprise; it is not used to designate phenomenal
aspects of experiences, their so-called ‘phenomenal’, or ‘subjective’,
or ‘qualitative’ character, or their ways of seeming or feeling for
someone, etc., as is often the case in analytical philosophy of mind
and consciousness. Husserlian phenomenology can in a first approxi-
mation be seen as a reflection-based descriptive science concerned
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with the essence of the phenomena of consciousness together with the
objects of consciousness as such, i.e. as correlates of consciousness.
Taken in this sense, the phenomenology of consciousness might
appear to be all there is to be philosophically investigated with
regard to consciousness and its objects. However, Husserl also had a
view on the relationship between phenomenology and metaphysics.1
Accordingly, I propose to address themain question, ‘Is there ameta-
physics of consciousness without a phenomenology of conscious-
ness?’ in two sections, followed by a short coda. In the first section,
I explain why the short answer, ‘no, there isn’t’, seems to me to be
correct by expanding a bit on the question ‘why not?’ Doing this
requires some comment on Husserl’s conception of philosophical
phenomenology, metaphysics, and the relation between them;
obviously, I cannot provide here more than a sketch of this. In
section 2, I outline a difficulty I have with materialistic or physicalis-
tic approaches regarding, as it is often put, ‘consciousness and its
place in nature’ or, put another way, with ‘the ontological status of
consciousness relative to the world of physical reality’, a difficulty
that arises in my understanding as soon as I take into consideration
detailed analyses of certain conscious experiences, particularly cogni-
tive experiences, along a Husserlian approach to the phenomenology
of consciousness, as sketched in section 1. In conclusion, I introduce a
twist regarding Husserl’s view of metaphysics by very briefly putting
forward what he characterized as ‘metaphysics in a new sense’ which
may to some extent at least meet concerns that were at the heart of
Timothy Sprigge’s metaphysical interests.
1. The Relationship Between Phenomenology and
Metaphysics
In order to characterize Husserl’s view of the relationship between
phenomenology and metaphysics, it may be helpful to recall some
of the methodological tenets of his phenomenology. Husserl
himself, e.g. in his programmatic Inaugural Lecture at the
University of Freiburg in 1917, spoke of his enterprise of descriptive
‘pure phenomenology’ as ‘the science of pure consciousness’, or as
‘science of the pure phenomena’, though obviously not taking
‘science’ in the sense of the empirical natural sciences which rely on
objective, third-person data. Rather, he viewed pure phenomenology
1 In this context, I am also reminded ofWilliam Seager’sMetaphysics of
Consciousness (London and New York: Routledge, 1991).
142
Eduard Marbach
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246110000123
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 16:08:33, subject to the Cambridge Core
as ‘a new philosophical basic science’. Husserl’s methodology cru-
cially relies on rigorously confining the analysis to that which reflec-
tion upon experiences2 themselves and purely as such provides – qua
consciousness of something of one kind or another, exclusively taken
as intentional correlate of the corresponding conscious experience,
with a view to elaborating concepts of the very possibility in principle
of experiencing this or that in such and such a way. Such properly
phenomenological concepts bring forth certain a priori constraints con-
cerning possible explanations of the structures of conscious experi-
ences, and lawful dependencies among them.
In this way, I think, Husserl was able to secure a pure givenness of
his research domain as a thematically independent field of investi-
gation. More technically speaking, with the method of what he
termed ‘phenomenological reduction’, he aimed at distinctly delimit-
ing the research domain of phenomenological analysis in its charac-
teristic ownness, that is, at establishing a theme of investigation
unmixed with empirical matters of fact. Thus, he left behind the
commonsensical everyday conception of conscious experiences as
psychological data ascribable to this or that creature, oneself
included, understood as this or that empirical self. Moreover, for
his philosophical theme of investigation, he also set aside the natural
scientific conception of experiences as ultimately neurological pro-
cesses in the brain. As a consequence of this methodologically motiv-
ated restriction, one of the most often recurring expressions in
Husserl’s writings is that of considering ‘consciousness purely as it
itself’ (‘Bewusstsein rein als es selbst’), namely just as it can be given
in pure reflection.
To be sure, in the course of the very formation of phenomenologi-
cal concepts, a given conscious experience of something provides the
experiential basis for the sought-after description of its invariant
structure or form according to its very possibility (that is, in
Husserlian terms, according to its ‘eidos’ or ‘essence’). Thus, for
example, a conscious experience of imagining a flying elephant, a
case of recollecting an episode from one’s own life, an experience of
picturing something, etc. will be submitted to such analysis. Of
such experiences we all have an everyday knowledge of acquaintance
that is reflected in the mental vocabulary of ordinary languages. In a
way, then, as Husserl occasionally says, we all ‘know’ of essential
differences of being conscious; however, this knowledge is only
2 In Husserlian phenomenology, the term ‘experience’, ‘Erlebnis’
or ‘Bewusstseinserlebnis’, covers sensory as well as cognitive, emotional,
affective experiences.
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implicit, and it is just the task of phenomenological reflection and
eidetic analysis systematically to explicate distinct phenomenological
concepts of the various kinds of consciousness. Based on one’s every-
day familiarity with a conscious experience of a certain kind as desig-
nated in ordinary language, a factually chosen case will be taken as a
purely arbitrary example of its kind, a mere starting point for the
analysis. Regarding this methodological step, Husserl liked to refer
to the mathematicians’ way of starting their analyses by saying,
‘there are … ’ (‘es gibt …’), say, such and such geometrical figures,
prime numbers, etc.3 Similarly, Husserl suggested, the phenomenol-
ogist adopts the attitude of saying, ‘there is, say, an experience of
imagining something’, of ‘picturing something’, etc. The chosen
experience, forming in this sense nothing more than an arbitrarily
selected example, does not bind the phenomenologist qua this or
that particular subjective experience, existing as a psychological
matter of fact which is such and so determined, occurring for
example with this or that degree of vivacity and distinctness of
content, etc. The irrelevance of the psychological matter of fact as
such for the purpose of the phenomenological concept formation
proper can also be seen when we realize that we must engage in a
process of varying the conditions in order to define which ones are
invariably required, or essential, for making the experience possible
as against those that can be changed without altering the essential
structure of the experience qua experience of the kind now to be
reflectively differentiated from other kinds.
Phenomenological analysis, then, is only interested in truly con-
stituent parts or properties capable of being distinguished in reflec-
tion as belonging to, and making together up, a unity of the
conscious experience under study in its own essence or nature, i.e.
in accordance with the conditions of the possibility of its occurrence,
and not of the actuality in its variability as a psychological matter of
fact. As Husserl put it in a lecture course of 1907:
The conditions of the ‘possibility of experience’ are the first.
Conditions of the possibility of experience signify, and may
signify, here, however, nothing else than all that resides imma-
nently in the essence of experience, in its essentia, and thereby
belongs to it irrevocably. The essence of experience, which is
3 See, e.g. E. Husserl, Phenomenology and the Foundations of the
Sciences, translated by T. E. Klein, Jr. and W. E. Phol (The Hague:
Nijhoff, 1980), §8, 41. See also E. Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil.
Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik, edited by Ludwig Landgrebe
(Hamburg: Meiner, 1985), §96.
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what is investigated in the phenomenological analysis of experi-
ence, is the same as the possibility of experience, and everything
established about the essence, about the possibility of experience,
is eo ipso a condition of the possibility of experience.4
Clearly, Husserl understood phenomenology as an eidetic science, or
an a priori science of pure consciousness and its correlates, in contrast
to the sciences of matters of fact. However, he did not simply limit
phenomenological philosophy to the essence or the a priori.
Whereas, in his view, eidetic phenomenology has to do with mere
ideal possibilities, it ismetaphysicswhich has to do with reality or actu-
ality (‘Wirklichkeit’). Husserl characterized ‘metaphysics’ as ‘the
genuine (‘eigentliche’) science of reality’ (‘Realität’) and he made it
clear that it was, in the end, also his aim to elaborate a metaphysics,
but he would stress that he wanted it to be ‘in a serious sense a scien-
tific’metaphysics, as opposed to mere metaphysical speculation, and
that therefore he put all his effort first into the ‘eidetic foundation’ of
such a metaphysics.5
Husserl had two reasons for the view that pure or transcendental
phenomenology qua eidetics had to precede, as its scientific basis,
‘metaphysics’ considered as the ‘absolute science of the factual
reality’ (‘faktische Wirklichkeit’). On the one hand – and I think that
this is a truly important point for all studies of consciousness -, con-
sciousness has a very peculiar ‘nature’ or essence: consciousness, con-
scious experience, is in an ‘incessant flux’, in an (as Husserl often put
it) ‘eternal Heraclitean flux’. As pure consciousness, it is, therefore,
scientifically graspable on the basis of essences only. Merely living
through individual experiences frommoment to moment and reflect-
ing upon them, in this sense having experience (‘Erfahrung’) of con-
sciousness is not enough for a phenomenological science of
consciousness which must provide results that are intersubjectively
controllable. To put it succinctly, ‘the fact’ of this or that occurring
conscious experience which serves as the basis for the reflective inves-
tigation, is here – in pure reflective phenomenology – ‘determinable
as that of its essence and only through (‘durch’) its essence and in no
4 E. Husserl, Thing and Space. Lectures of 1907, translated by Richard
Rojcewicz (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997), §40, 119.
5 Compare draft of a letter to Karl Joël, 11. III. 1914 in E. Husserl,
Briefwechsel, Band VI. Philosophenbriefe. In Verbindung mit Elisabeth
Schuhmann, herausgegeben von Karl Schuhmann (Dordrecht: Kluwer,
1994), 205f.
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way to be documented by means of inductive experience as it is the
case in the objective world’.6
On the other hand, the reason for the view that phenomenology as
eidetics (as science of the possibilities) had to precede ‘metaphysics’
was for Husserl linked to a general principle of the theory of
science, namely that everything factual (‘alles Tatsächliche’; all
matters of fact, all a posteriori) finds ultimately its full rationality in
the eidetic or in the a priori. As Husserl held – very much in line
with the traditional so-called rationalists and their ‘vérités de
raison’ as against ‘vérités de fait’ (Descartes, Leibniz) – all reason
(rationality) in the a posteriori has its principles a priori, and these
principles are the justifying reasons (‘Rechtsgründe’) of the objective
validity of knowledge. The old ontological doctrine, that knowledge
of the possibilities has to precede knowledge of the actualities
(‘Wirklichkeiten’) is, according to Husserl, ‘a great truth’ if correctly
understood and put to use in the right way.7
In this sense, then, Husserl considered eidetic phenomenology of
the possibilities to be First Philosophy, and metaphysics, as the
science of the actualities, is ‘Second Philosophy’ or ‘Empirical
Philosophy’. By way of applying pure eidetic phenomenology to
matters of fact concerning consciousness – in analogy to applying
pure mathematics to the actual world of physics –, empirical research
into consciousness would receive its ultimate, i.e. its metaphysical
interpretation, behind which it would make no sense to look for a
further interpretation.8 In short, then, from the point of view of
Husserl’s philosophical phenomenology there can’t be a scientifically
valuable metaphysics of consciousness without a phenomenology of
consciousness.
6 Compare E. Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and
Transcendental Phenomenology, translated by David Carr (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1970). §52, 178; translation slightly
amended.
7 See, e.g. E. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und
phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Allgemeine Einführung in die
reine Phänomenologie, edited by Karl Schuhmann, Husserliana III/1 (Den
Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), 178; compare also Einleitung in die Logik
und Erkenntnistheorie. Vorlesungen 1906/07, edited by U. Melle,
Husserliana XXIV (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), §40, 236ff.
8 See E. Husserl, Erste Philosophie (1923/24). Kritische
Ideengeschichte, edited by Rudolf Boehm, Husserliana VII (Den Haag:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1956), 187f., note 1.
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2. A Difficulty Regarding Consciousness and Its Place in
Nature
Let us now turn to the above-mentioned difficulty regarding the place
of consciousness in the natural world, or put another way, regarding
the ontological or metaphysical status of consciousness relative to
the world of physical reality. In order to clarify this difficulty, it is
necessary to engage in some descriptive-eidetic phenomenology.
Despite all my respect and sympathy for defenders of a unitary
view of reality inspired by modern science, I continue to be deeply
impressed by results from philosophical phenomenology, providing
us with forms or structures of consciousness that in principle seem
to have no analogue in the natural world as it is studied by the
sciences.9 Indeed, as I understand the lesson of the sciences of
the external physical world out there and the neurosciences of the
brain, the world as it really is in itself exists as a whole of spatial
and/or temporal parts-outside-parts, three-dimensional time-slices,
all the way down to the ultimate particles on a scale of nanometres,
forming cohesions and functional unities involved in all kinds of
states that are parts of a system of possible states. By contrast, as
Husserl often observed, it belongs to the essence of conscious life
not to be structured in terms of ‘the spatial outside one another,
into one another and through one another and spatial totality’ but
to contain in itself intentional implications and modifications that
cannot be accounted for in spatial terms, even though spatial meta-
phors in describing forms or structures of conscious experiences
crop up time and again.10 In Husserl’s view, even Brentano was
still a naturalist precisely because ‘something like intentional impli-
cation and intentional analysis as analysis of possibly continuously
intertwined sense-giving he did not yet know’.11
Clear examples providing evidence for such structures sui generis
are given by certain conscious experiences that involve non-actual
components or moments in their very way of establishing intentional
reference to something when they actually occur. Such a finding, I
9 See E. Husserl, Phänomenologische Psychologie. Vorlesungen
Sommersemester 1925, edited by Walter Biemel, Husserliana IX (Den
Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962), 35ff.
10 See, e.g. ibid., 37: ‘… dass es zum Wesen des Bewusstseinslebens
gehört, anstelle des räumlichen Aussereinander, Ineinander und
Durcheinander und räumlicher Ganzheit ein intentionales … ineinander
meinend Beschlossensein in sich zu bergen…’.
11 Ibid.
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take it, is very hard to integrate into a description of reality couched in
the language of physics or the neurosciences which a complete natu-
ralization of consciousness would have to amount to. The conscious
experiences in question make up the large and important class of
mentally re-presenting something that is not actually present, ‘Akte
der Vergegenwärtigung’, acts of re-presenting something, which
Husserl has investigated extensively. Thus, e.g. when I am engaged
in an activity of visually re-presenting, thereby actually intentionally
referring to something – say, a past event that I remember visually, or
a possible one that I imagine, or an object that I see as being depicted
in a picture – then not only is the re-presented object or event con-
sciously given as being not actually present, but at the same time the
conscious experience of so referring to something absent contains
within its very structure an experiential component of not actually per-
formed perceiving (seeing). If so, then there is something actually
occurring in this world an essential property of which is that parts
of it are consciously experienced as non-actual.
By the way, I take it that as long as we would confine our attention
somewhat abstractly just to sensory conscious experiences occurring
here and now in causal interaction with the actual surrounding
world, there is not so much reflective work for phenomenology to
do regarding structures of these experiences qua structures of con-
sciousness to be articulated in the language of phenomenology.
Still, their temporal form, their associative connections and emotion-
al colourings as well as their being part of a horizonal consciousness
(‘Horizontbewusstsein’) could be, and have been, studied phenomen-
ologically as making up their specific what-it-is-likeness qua sensory
experiences. Much more structural knowledge would no doubt come
from neurophysiological investigation into the specific physical char-
acter of the brain states that are causally responsible for the phenom-
enal character of the corresponding sensory experiences – even
though, I think, the so-called ‘hard problem’ would remain, the
problem of explaining why this or that sensory experience should
have the specific what-it-is-like aspect it does, rather than having
some other phenomenal character or having none at all.12 I am not
so thrilled by this problem at the level of sensory experiences given
their facticity and hence intractability. It is very tempting to say
that I am pleased to have all this motley of sensory impressions,
they make life so colorful, but there they are, matters of fact, and,
12 Cf. e.g. D. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996).
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as Tim Crane disarmingly put it, ‘some facts are amazing, and some-
times that’s all that can be said’.13
Let us stick, then, to kinds of more or less complex non-sensory or
properly cognitive acts of re-presenting something, involving also
sensory components, to be sure. All such acts, I also take to be in
themselves so many modes, simply more complex ones, of what-it-
is-like to experience them, to live through them and, by having
them, to establish intentional reference to something that we experi-
ence in its absence. Concerning the conscious experiences them-
selves, they are exemplified solely in the experiential life of a
subject, originally in my own mental life, and this already when
they are unreflected on at the time we have them. This, I take it, is
just the sense of the present-day phrase that there is ‘something-it-
is-like’ to have this or that conscious experience: it pre-reflectively,
as Husserl and later on Sartre would have put it, feels somehow or
other, say, to perceive something out there, and it feels differently
or there is something-other-it-is-like, say, to see something in a
picture, or to remember something, etc. Only on the basis of the
subject’s reflection upon the experiential life can these ways of
what-it-is-likeness then be described in general statements regarding
their distinct structures, forming thereby descriptive phenomenolo-
gical concepts of the conscious experiences. To account philosophi-
cally for similarities and distinctions among the varieties of the
intentionality of conscious experiences and their intentional corre-
lates, as they present themselves as phenomena, i.e. at the level of
their phenomenality, was no doubt much at the center of Husserl’s
eidetic ‘science of consciousness’.
Let me expand a little on some distinctions with a more refined
analysis along Husserlian lines. The case of picture viewing is particu-
larly well suited to point out what differently structured conscious
experiences as such are able to achieve. Consider, for example, a
change from a conscious experience of simply perceiving a green
pine over there in the meadow to a conscious experience of pictorially
re-presenting a green pine and its surroundings. Here, reflective analy-
sis, and I think, at first at least, only reflective analysis, is able to
articulate a radical difference regarding the structure of the corre-
sponding conscious experiences themselves and, correlatively, of
the ways of givenness of the intentional object, the green pine and
its surroundings. To begin with, notice the following aspect.
Concretely viewed, i.e. not in isolation, the color green in the pictorial
13 T. Crane, Elements of Mind. An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 89.
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representation is attributed, not to a portion of the flat canvas as such,
but rather either to the merely pictorially appearing but not actually
given pine on the canvas or to the depicted and again not actually
given pine somewhere in the real world or in a fictional space,
depending on where the person viewing the picture is focusing her
attention. Either way, the presently manifest quality green is here
taken, or apprehended, as a property of an object that is not actually
present over therewhere the canvas actually is and where the phenom-
enal quality green appears. If so – namely in so far as I have conscious
experience of the green as of a property of the pine – the phenomenal
quality green cannot be given solely in virtue of a sensory-perceptual
visual experience; for there is actually no pine to be visually perceived
over there on the wall where the painting is hanging. What we have
instead is a more complex conscious experience of intentionally refer-
ring to the depicted pine by way of seeing as it were the green pine in
so far as it appears on a canvas, i.e. as a pictorial object. In its unified
structure such an experience also involves as a conscious component
among others my seeing the green pine in the mode of non-actuality,
namely precisely in so far as the pine seems to appear on the canvas
over there that I actually see. In other words, the phenomenal
quality green appears no longer as actually belonging to a portion
of the canvas or the picture-surface over there. But the pictorially
appearing pine’s being green – in contradistinction to a perceptually
appearing pine’s being green – only appears so because of my con-
sciously taking the pictorial object ‘pine’ to be a representation of
an absent (real or imaginary) tree that is only depicted in the
picture that I actually see in the present surroundings.
Crucially, the conscious component of my seeing in the mode of non-
actuality, as Husserl has convincingly explained, constitutes an inten-
tional modification and can be said to be intentionally implied in the
unified conscious experience that I have of seeing something picto-
rially represented, and clearly this is not a matter of being spatially
contained within the experience in the sense of being a part outside
other parts. Let me spell this out in a little more detail. What other
components are there in such a unified experience of pictorially
representing something that do not stand in external spatial relations
to one another? Consider first that while I am intentionally referring
to the green pine only in so far as it appears in the picture over there, I
am simultaneously aware ofmy present surroundings here and now in
virtue of actually perceiving the world around me as well, although
somewhat less attentively as long as I am interested in the depicted
scene or in the scene as it pictorially appears on the canvas. The
fact that I take the pine and its surroundings not to be actually
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present over there depends, precisely, on a consciously experienced
contrast concerning, on the one hand, the ways of givenness of the
objects around me, and among them the picture on the wall
showing the green pine in its surroundings, and on the other hand,
the ways of givenness of the pine either in so far as it pictorially
appears on the canvas or is taken as the depicted pine somewhere in
the real world or in some fictional world, respectively. There is a
clash between that which I take to be actually real around me and
that which I take to be just a pictorially represented, not actually
given, scene. It is in relation to this pictorially appearing or depicted
scene in contrast to the actually perceived surroundings that I speak of
seeing something in the mode of non-actuality; for I cannot actually
see what is not actually there. To be sure, I actually look over there to
the picture and thus, in a sense, I actually see something over there,
just as I actually see the wall over there where the whole picture
that I actually see is hanging – I actually see patches of green etc.
However, as Husserl would urge, as soon as I take those green
patches to be ways of appearing of a pine – be it the pine in so far
as it appears in the picture or the depicted real or imaginary pine –
the very experience of seeing is consciously modified: I do not
believe I actually see a pine over there. As I understand the matter,
my seeing the pine is, however, not simply a particular kind of
seeing, a so-called ‘representational seeing’ or a ‘seeing-in’ as ‘the
subsidiary capacity that we also have’, besides ‘the standard capacity
that we have of vision’.14 Instead, to the extent that in picture viewing
vision is involved in relation to the pictorially appearing objects, it is
altogether experientially modified, not unlikewhat obtains in visually
remembering or imagining something that is not actually, presently
given, although not quite like it either.
To clarify matters further, notice next that with my seeing as it
were the green pine in its surroundings in so far as it appears in the
picture or is depicted by the picture that I actually see over there, I
do not simply intentionally refer to the pine as if I were seeing the
pine itself in some imaginary or remembered place. Yet, there is simi-
larity to some extent between picture viewing and imagining or
remembering, namely to the extent, precisely, of involving a visual
experience in themode of non-actuality and an object that is not actu-
ally given. For notice that in the case of, say, an experience of simply
14 See, e.g. R. Wollheim, The Mind and Its Depths (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1993), 188 and C. Peacocke, ‘Depiction’, The
Philosophical Review 96:3 (1987), 383–410, discussing earlier proposals by
Wollheim.
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imagining a pine in imaginary surroundings, the pine would again
not actually be given but only appear as it were, this time in relation
to an imaginarily occupied point of view of mine from where I
would see the tree itself, albeit only as it were, i.e. in a consciously
modified manner. This is to say that once again vision would not
be functioning in a standard way. My visual experience would
indeed not actually be performed but only be re-presented: it
would be as if I were seeing the not actually given pine from some
place, at some distance and orientation relative to my standpoint in
the imaginary space. By contrast, when I intentionally refer to the
pine in so far as it appears in the picture, I can do so only because
at the very same time I am aware of the pine’s merely being a pictorial
representation of a tree, be it a real tree in the world or be it merely a
fictional tree. The situation, in picture viewing, is indeed rather
special, as has often been observed by philosophers and also among
scientific psychologists, among whom may be numbered Richard
Wollheim, Richard L. Gregory, J. J. Gibson and others. I am
neither simply actually perceiving or seeing an object ‘in’ a picture,
nor am I simply purely mentally representing the not actually given
object itself, say, in remembering or imagining it in a different space
and at a different time. Rather, to sum up, in picture viewing, i.e.
when I pictorially re-present some absent object – a thing, person,
place, or event – I am intentionally referring to the absent, not actually
given object (the so-called sujet, say, of a painting) by means of my re-
presenting a non-actual perceiving of the object (the sujet) in so far as it
appears in the actually perceived picturewhile simultaneously present-
ing my actual surroundings here and now.
In such conscious experiences of purely mentally or of pictorially
re-presenting something absent (past, future, merely possible, or
elsewhere in space, etc.), as well as in more complex conscious experi-
ences of mentally re-presenting something absent by way of re-
presenting an act of pictorially re-presenting it (say, in remembering
or imagining an episode of picture viewing), there is always the reflec-
tive phenomenological finding of those modified components of non-
actuality belonging to the very structure of the actually experienced
mental activity: one’s being conscious or aware of intending some-
thing absent, and one’s being innerly conscious or aware of the
non-actual experience – in the simplest case, a perceptual experience –
that is implied in the actually occurring establishment of the inten-
tional reference to the absent object. The very givenness of the
intended absent, not actually given object as well as the very givenness
of the intentionally implied or modified non-actual component of, say,
seeing as it were the absent object, is bound to occur within the unified
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structure of the actually performed conscious experience of re-present-
ing together with the presentation of the actual surroundings.
In this sense, then, I think that with each instance of an actually
occurring conscious experience of re-presenting something absent in
virtue of components that are experienced as non-actual, we have clear
examples of actually existing entities in our world that do not fit into
the framework of the sciences of the natural, physical world. At any
rate, thosenon-actual components of the actuallyoccurring experiences
of re-presenting something cannot be understood as being spatially dis-
tinct from the actual experiences; being non-actual, they can only be
individuatedby the experiencing subject as being consciouslymodified
re-presented parts of the subject’s actual re-presenting something.
3. Coda: Metaphysics in a New Sense
In Section 1, the relationship between phenomenology andmetaphy-
sics was presented such that metaphysics would only be at stake in
Husserl’s overall conception of philosophy as ‘second philosophy’,
or ‘empirical philosophy’ in the sense of an application of eidetic
first philosophy to empirical matters of fact in view of an ultimate
interpretation, or a rationalization, of the a posteriori. In conclusion,
I would like to point out, albeit very briefly, that Husserl’s philos-
ophy of the actuality (‘Wirklichkeit’), i.e. his ‘metaphysics’, was ulti-
mately not simply equivalent to such an eidetic phenomenological
interpretation of the sciences of empirical matters of fact. What
Husserl, from relatively early on in his work, did consider beyond
has to do with ‘the irrationality of the transcendental fact which
expresses itself in the constitution of the factual world and in the
factual life of the mind: thus metaphysics in a new sense’.15 In
Husserl’s view, the irrational fact of the rationality of the world was
the object of metaphysics in this new sense.
Intriguingly, in his last years, Husserl even questioned his distinc-
tion between First and Second Philosophy, formerly oriented after
the priority of the eidetically possible over the actual, eidetic philos-
ophy being considered as science of pure possibilities. Even ‘the pure I’
(‘das reine Ich’), belonging to the ‘field’ of transcendental phenomen-
ology, was for many years conceived by Husserl as a pure possibility,
an ‘I in general’ (‘Ich überhaupt’), preceding the actuality. However,
in a text from 1931, he totally reversed this conception by noting, with
15 See E. Husserl, Erste Philosophie, op. cit., Chapter 3: ‘Rationalismus
und Metaphysik der Neuzeit’, 188n.
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regard to the eidos transcendental I, that ‘we have here a peculiar and
unique case, namely concerning the relationship between fact and
eidos’: whereas, generally, the being of eidetic possibilities – e.g. in
pure mathematics – is free, independent of, the being or not-being of
any corresponding realization of such possibilities, ‘the eidos transcenden-
tal I is inconceivablewithout a transcendental I as factual’. After speaking
of the full ontology as teleology and of the facticity presupposed by this
teleology, the text continues: ‘Weendupwithultimate “matters of fact”
– Urtatsachen, with ultimate necessities, the Urnotwendigkeiten. But I
think them, I question back … I am the primal fact (‘Urfaktum’) in
this course, I see that these and these primal constituents of my own
result in my questioning, as primal structures (‘Urstrukturen’) of my
facticity. And that I in myself carry a core of “primal contingency”
(‘Kernvon “Urzufälligem”’) in eidetic forms, in forms of potential func-
tioning, in which the mundane eidetic necessities are then founded. I
cannot transgress my factual being and in it not the intentionally con-
tained co-being (‘Mitsein’) of others etc. thus the absolute actuality
(‘die absolute Wirklichkeit’)”.16
Even though, after this reversal, Husserl did no more systemati-
cally elaborate the relationship between the phenomenological eide-
tics of consciousness, the actuality and the empirical fact, he firmly
upheld the eidetics as condition of the possibility of transcendental
cognition of consciousness and its objects until as late as in the
Crisis of 193617. And even though for us the acknowledgment of a
thorough facticity of the transcendental I may raise novel and press-
ing questions regarding the naturalization of consciousness in a phe-
nomenological perspective, it would still seem that the very theme of
consciousness as such and of its objects considered as ‘correlates’ – as
it has been the central theme ofHusserl’s own philosophical phenom-
enology – remain a valuable theme of philosophical investigation into
consciousness, whatever the core of ‘primal contingency’ in eidetic
forms will turn out to be.18
University of Bern, Switzerland
16 E. Husserl, Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, Dritter Teil
1929–1935, edited by Iso Kern, Husserliana XV (Den Haag: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1973), Nr. 22, 385f.
17 E. Husserl, The Crisis, op. cit., see note 6 above.
18 I would like to thank Pauline Phemister for carefully editing and lin-
guistically improving my text; my thanks also go to Pierfrancesco Basile for
his help, and to all the organizers for extending the invitation to participate
in the Conference in Honour of the late Timothy Sprigge.
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